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We investigate the eﬀect of the split-award tort reform, where the state takes a share of the
plaintiﬀ’s punitive damage award, on the ﬁrm’s level of care, the likelihood of trial and the social
costs of accidents. A decrease in the plaintiﬀ’s share of the punitive damage award decreases the
likelihood of trial but also reduces the ﬁrm’s level of care and therefore, increases the probability
of accidents. Conditions under which a decrease in the plaintiﬀ’s share of the punitive damage
award reduces the social cost of accidents are derived.
KEYWORDS: Settlement; Bargaining; Litigation; Asymmetric Information
JEL Categories: K41, C70, D82
∗We are grateful for research support from the University of Alberta (Support for the Advancement of Scholarship
Grant, 2002-2003). C.M. Landeo also acknowledges research funding from the University of Pittsburgh (Andrew
Mellon Pre-Doctoral Fellowship, 2001-2002). We wish to thank John Duﬀy, Jack Ochs, Greg Pogarsky, Jennifer
Reinganum, and especially Linda Babcock for helpful discussions and comments, and conference participants at
the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, the 2003 North American Summer Meeting of
the Econometric Society, the 2003 Annual Meeting of the Canadian Law and Economics Association, and the 2003
Annual Meeting of the Canadian Economic Association. The usual qualiﬁer applies.1 Introduction
There is a common perception that excessive punitive damage awards1 have contributed to the es-
calation of liability insurance premiums2 and have generated excessive ﬁnancial burden on ﬁrms.3
This perception, combined with the Supreme Court adjudications, has motivated several tort re-
forms in U.S. states (Sloane, 1993). Some reforms take the form of caps or limits on punitive
damage awards while others mandate that a portion of the award be allocated to the plaintiﬀ with
the remainder going to the state. These latter reforms, called “split-awards” have been imple-
mented in Alaska, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri, Oregon, and Utah.4 In addition, New
Jersey, California and Texas have contemplated, but not yet adopted, split-award statutes (White,
2002).
Split-awards aﬀect litigation outcomes and liability. Given that split-awards reduce the plain-
tiﬀ’s award in case of trial but do not aﬀect the defendant’s5 payment at trial, these statutes
generate an incentive for both parties to settle out of court and induce the plaintiﬀ to accept
a lower settlement oﬀer.6 As a result, split-awards reduce the ﬁrm’s expected litigation loss and
therefore, inﬂuence its expenditures on accident prevention (ﬁrm’s level of care) and the probability
of accidents. In addition, the lower plaintiﬀ’s expected compensation under split-awards reduces
the plaintiﬀ’s windfall and aﬀect the incentives to ﬁle a lawsuit.7 As a consequence, the ﬁrm’s
1Justice O’Connor stated that punitive damage awards had “skyrocketed” more than 30 times in the previous ten
years, with an increase in the highest award from $ 250,000 to $ 10,000,000 (Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282, 1989).
2Note that liability coverage is widely spread in the United States. In 1990, the total tort liability payments were
approximately $ 65 billion (more than 1% of the U.S. GDP), of which 93.5% were made by liability insurers (O
Connell, Bock and Petoe, 1994).
3Karpoﬀ and Lott (1999)ﬁnd that announcements of lawsuits seeking punitive damages caused losses in market
capitalization of listed companies’ shares that, on average, exceeded the eventual settlement. They attribute this
eﬀect to lawyers fees and lasting damage to corporate reputations.
4Statutes vary with the state: the base for computation of the state’s share can be the gross punitive award or the
award net of attorney’s fees; the state’s share can be 50%, 60% or 75%; the destination of the state’s funds can be
the Treasury, the Department of Human Services or indigent victims funds. For details, see Dodson (2000), Epstein
(1994), Stevens (1994), Sloane (1993).
5We will use the terms ﬁrm, defendant and injurer interchangeably.
6Given that the plaintiﬀ’s payoﬀ at trial is lower under the split-award, she is more willing to accept lower oﬀers.
7The “plaintiﬀ’s windfall” refers to any amount in excess of the costs of pursuing the punitive claim. Commentators
claim that this windfall promotes unnecessary litigation (Dodson, 2000).
1expected litigation loss and its level of care will be further reduced.8
However, previous studies of the split-award tort reform have focused only on its eﬀects on
litigation outcomes. This paper extends those studies by investigating the eﬀects of this reform
on litigation outcomes and the ﬁrm’s level of care. We construct a strategic model of liability
and litigation, that allows for heterogeneity in ﬁrms’ costs of preventing accidents and therefore,
permits to study ﬁrm’s decision about the level of care.9
Our model consists of two stages. First, there is a ﬁrm’s optimization stage, where a level of
care is chosen by the ﬁrm according to its cost of preventing accidents and the expected litigation
loss in case of an accident. The level of care determines the probability that an accident occurs. If
an accident occurs, a litigation stage begins. It is modeled as a signaling-ultimatum game, where
two Bayesian risk-neutral parties, an uninformed plaintiﬀ and an informed defendant,10 negotiate
prior to a costly trial.
We build upon Png’s (1987) theoretical framework, developed to study the eﬀects of changes
in the court award, negligence standard and the allocation of litigation costs (from the American
to the English rule)11 on liability and litigation.12 We extend Png’s work in a number of ways.
First, we incorporate the split-award statute into the framework. Second, we establish suﬃcient
conditions for a unique litigation stage equilibrium that survives the universal divinity reﬁnement
(Banks and Sobel, 1987). Third, we ﬁnd a suﬃcient condition for the positive relationship between
8Polinsky and Che (1991)propose a liability system where the award to the plaintiﬀ diﬀers from the payment
by the defendant (i.e., awards are decoupled). This system makes the defendant’s payment as high as possible and
therefore, it allows the award to the plaintiﬀ to be lowered. The authors claim that this policy reduces the incentives
to sue without aﬀecting the ﬁrm’s incentives to take care. Note that the reduction in the plaintiﬀ’s award resembles
the split-award statute. However, the split-award reform does not involve an increase in the award paid by the
defendant.
Choi and Sanchirico (2003)show that the system proposed by Polinsky and Che (1991)may still have a negative
eﬀect on deterrence. Given that the award paid by defendants is increased, they will spend more on legal advice.
This will force plaintiﬀs to spend more on attorneys as well and discourage some plaintiﬀs from ﬁling a lawsuit.
9Spier (1997)also uses a framework that combines liability and litigation to study the divergence between the
private and social motive to settle under a negligence rule. In her model, however, there is only one type of defendant
(i.e., all defendants have the same cost of achieving a given level of care). See also Hylton (2002), Polinsky and
Rubinfeld (1988), and Ordover’s (1978) seminal paper.
10The defendant possesses information about its cost of preventing accidents and therefore, about its level of care
and the decision of the court should the case go to trial.
11Under the American rule each party pays her own litigation costs at trial. In contrast, under the English rule
the loser at trial pays the litigation costs of the winner.
12Png does not conduct social welfare analyses of these reforms.
2the plaintiﬀ’s share of the punitive award and the probability of trial. Fourth, we study the eﬀects
of this statute on social cost of accidents and establish necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a
reduction in social costs of accidents under the split-award regime. Our analysis generates a unique
empirically relevant equilibrium in which the more eﬃcient ﬁrms choose to be careful and the less
eﬃcient ones choose to be negligent and one where some lawsuits are dropped, some are resolved
out-of-court and some go to trial.
A previous formal study of the split-award statute, conducted by Daughety and Reinganum
(2003), addresses the eﬀects of this reform on litigation but not on liability.13 They examine the
eﬀects of the split-award reform on the likelihood of trial and settlement amounts by modeling the
pre-trial bargaining as a strategic game of incomplete information between two Bayesian players,
an informed defendant14 and an uninformed plaintiﬀ, using signaling and screening games setups.
They ﬁnd that holding ﬁling constant, split-award statutes simultaneously lower settlement amounts
and the likelihood of trial. We extend this study by modeling the defendant’s level of care decision
and analyzing the eﬀect of the split-award tort reform on the probability of accidents and the social
cost of accidents.
Consistent with Daughety and Reinganum (2003), we predict that, holding ﬁling constant, a
decrease in the plaintiﬀ’s share of the award decreases the conditional and unconditional probabil-
ities of trial. Given that the split-award statute applies only when the case is settled in court, the
parties have an incentive to settle out of court in order to cut out the state. In addition, we ﬁnd
that a reduction in the plaintiﬀ’s share of the award increases the probability of accidents. This
eﬀect arises because a decrease in the plaintiﬀ’s share reduces expected litigation costs. The ﬁrm
reacts to these lower expected costs by reducing expenditures on safety. Conditions under which
this reform reduces the social cost of accidents are derived.
The paper is organized as follows. Section Two presents the setup and solution of the model.
13Kahan and Tuckman (1995)also study the eﬀects of the split-award statute on litigation. However, they use
a simultaneous-move game with inconsistent priors (non-Bayesian players)and do not model explicitly the pre-trial
bargaining stage.
14The defendant knows the true probability that he will be found liable for gross negligence and made to pay
punitive damages, should the case go to trial.
3Section Three describes the eﬀects of the split-award statute on the ﬁrm’s level of care, probability
of accidents, litigation outcomes, and social costs of accidents. Section Four contains concluding
remarks and outlines possible directions for further research.
2 The Model
Nature ﬁrst decides the eﬃciency type n of the ﬁrm from a continuum of types. We deﬁne φ(n)a s
the probability density function of the distribution of ﬁrms by type and y(n) as the level of product
safety (level of care) for a ﬁrm of type n. The realization of n is revealed only to the ﬁrm but φ(n)
is common knowledge. The ﬁrm’s type determines its cost c(y(n),n) of achieving a given level of
care y(n). We deﬁne λ(y(n)) as the probability of an accident for a ﬁrm of type n, that depends
on the level of care y(n), and assume that the higher the level of care y, the lower the probability
of an accident (i.e., the probability of accident is a decreasing function of the level of care).
After observing its type, the ﬁrm then decides its optimal level of care, i.e., the one that
minimizes its total expected loss L. We deﬁne the defendant’s total expected loss function as
L = c(y(n),n)+λ(y(n))l,w h e r el is the expected loss from legal action, diﬀerent for careful and
negligent defendants. The ﬁrm is careful if the level of care chosen is greater than or equal to the
due standard of care ¯ y (exogenous and common knowledge parameter);15 otherwise, the ﬁrm is
negligent.
If an accident occurs, the litigation stage starts. The plaintiﬀ ﬁrst decides whether to ﬁle a
lawsuit. This decision is based on her beliefs about the negligence of the defendant conditional on
the occurrence of an accident: with probability q she believes that the defendant is negligent, and
with probability (1−q) she believes that the defendant is careful.16 We assume that the plaintiﬀ’s
15The due standard of care, ¯ y, is set by the court. We assume that the cost of collecting information about each
defendant is too high, so the court sets a unique due standard of care at the value that equates the marginal cost of
preventing accidents (computed over all types of defendants)to the marginal beneﬁt of avoiding social harm due to
accidents, and applies this standard to all defendants. Let H be the social harm due to accidents, c(.)the expenditure
on care, and λ(.)the probability of accidents for a ﬁrm of type n. Then, ¯ y is set so that
 
n≥0 cy(¯ y,n)φ(n)dn =
−λ
 (¯ y)H.
Note that the mechanism for computing ¯ y suggested here resembles the Hand rule used by courts to determine
negligence. According to the Hand rule, a party is negligent if an accident occurred as a result of a party’s failure to
take a particular precaution, and if the cost of the precaution is less than the expected harm.
16The values for q and (1−q)depend on the optimal levels of care chosen by all ﬁrms in the ﬁrst stage of the game,
4expected payoﬀ from suing is positive. Therefore, every injured plaintiﬀ has an incentive to ﬁle a
suit. The pre-trial bargaining negotiation is modeled as a signaling-ultimatum game. The defendant
has the ﬁrst move and makes a settlement proposal. After observing the proposal, the plaintiﬀ,
who knows only the distribution of n, decides whether to drop the case, to accept the defendant’s
proposal (out-of-court settlement) or to reject the proposal (bring the case to the trial stage). The
plaintiﬀ’s decision is based on her updated beliefs about the type of defendant she is confronting
after observing the defendant’s proposal. If the plaintiﬀ drops the case, both players incur no legal
costs. If the plaintiﬀ accepts the defendant’s proposal, the game ends and the defendant pays to
the plaintiﬀ the amount proposed.
If the plaintiﬀ rejects the proposal, plaintiﬀ and defendant incur exogenous legal costs (KP and
KD, respectively). If the defendant is negligent, the court awards punitive damages A17 to the
plaintiﬀ. Under the split-award regime, the plaintiﬀ receives only a fraction f of the total punitive
award,18 and the state gets a share (1 − f) of the award.19 If the plaintiﬀ rejects the proposal and
the defendant is careful, no punitive damages are awarded.20 The sequence of events in the game
i ss h o w ni nF i g u r e1 .
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
We start by ﬁnding the solution of the litigation stage, using the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
concept. Second, we solve the defendant’s optimization problem and ﬁnd the defendant’s optimal
level of care. This level of care depends on the defendant’s type and the litigation stage equilibrium.
according to their types and expected litigation costs (that correspond to the equilibrium in the litigation stage).
Note that the values of q and (1 − q)are common knowledge, but the ﬁrm’s type and the chosen level of care are
known only by the ﬁrm.
17Given that A is determined by the jury, it is an exogenous parameter of the model.
For the sake of mathematical simplicity and given that our primary goal is to explore the eﬀect of the split-award
statute which applies to the punitive damage award only, we abstract from compensatory damage awards. Our
qualitative results will also hold if we include the compensatory award in the model.
18We assume that the split-award is computed over the gross punitive award. Our qualitative results, however, will
also hold in case of computing the split-award over the punitive award net of plaintiﬀ’ litigation costs.
19Given that A is determined by the jury and the information about the split-statute is supposed to be kept from
the jury, A does not depend on f. We thank Jennifer Reinganum for this suggestion.
Note also that, under the computation of the standard of due care based on the Hand Rule, ¯ y does not depend on
f.
20We have restricted the proposal space to [0,fA− KP] (i.e., a proposal cannot be negative or greater than the
maximum amount the plaintiﬀ can get in court).
52.1 Solution of the Litigation Stage
We focus our analysis on the unique empirically relevant equilibrium of the litigation stage under
conditions qfA− KP > 0a n dfA− KP >K D, that survives Sobel and Bank’s universal divinity
reﬁnement:21 a partially separating equilibrium in which some cases are dropped, some proceed to
trial, while others settle before trial.22
Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium of the litigation stage.
Proposition 1. Assume that qfA− KP > 0a n dfA− KP >K D. The following litigation strategy
proﬁle, together with the plaintiﬀ’s beliefs, represents the equilibrium path of the unique universally
divine Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the litigation stage.
Strategy Proﬁle
1) The plaintiﬀ always ﬁles a suit. In response to an oﬀer S1 = 0, the plaintiﬀ rejects the oﬀer
(goes to trial) with probability α =
fA−KP
A+KD and accepts the oﬀer (drops the action) with probability
(1−α)=
A+KD−fA+KP
A+KD ; the plaintiﬀ always accepts the oﬀer S2 = fA−KP (settles out-of-court).
2) The negligent defendant makes no oﬀer (oﬀers S1 = 0) with probability β =
KP(1−q)
q(fA−KP) and
oﬀers S2 = fA− KP with probability (1 − β)=
q(fA−KP)−KP(1−q)
q(fA−KP) . The careful defendant always
makes no oﬀer (oﬀers S1 =0 ) .
Plaintiﬀ’s Beliefs
The equilibrium beliefs are as follows. If an accident occurs, the plaintiﬀ believes with probabil-
ity (1−q) that she is confronting a careful defendant, and with probability q that she is confronting
a negligent defendant. When the plaintiﬀ receives an oﬀer, she updates her beliefs using Bayes’ rule:
when she receives an oﬀer S1 = 0, she believes with probability
(1−q)
qβ+(1−q) that she is confronting a
21Condition qfA − KP > 0 ensures that plaintiﬀs always ﬁle a suit (necessary condition)and condition the
fA− KP >K D rules out pooling equilibria (suﬃcient condition). Under these conditions, there are other partially
separating equilibria, that are non-empirically relevant (i.e., they do not allow for lawsuits to be dropped)and do
not survive the universal divinity reﬁnement.
22Data from the U.S. Department of Justice indicate, for a sample of the largest 75 counties (1-year period ending
in 1992), that 76.5% of product liability cases were disposed through agreed settlement and voluntary dismissal and
3.3% were disposed by trial verdict. The other 20.2% were disposed as follows: 4.5% by summary judgment, 0.5% by
default judgment, 6% were dismissed, 2.7% by arbitration award, 6.1% by transfer, and 0.3% by other dispositions
(Smith et al., 1995).
6careful defendant and with probability
qβ
qβ+(1−q) that she is confronting a negligent defendant; when
the plaintiﬀ receives an oﬀer S2 = fA− KP, she believes with certainty that she is confronting a
negligent defendant.





<fA− KP, she believes that this oﬀer was made by a negligent defendant.
Proof. See Appendix A.







and VDN = −(fA− KP), respectively.
The conditional probabilities of out-of-court settlement (acceptance of an oﬀer S2 = fA−KP),
dropping a lawsuit (acceptance of an oﬀer S1 = 0) and trial (rejection of an oﬀer S1 =0 )a r ea s





the conditional probability of dropping the lawsuit
(1 − α)[1 − q(1 − β)] =
 







and the conditional probability of trial




2.2 Optimization Problem of the Defendant
The defendant’s optimization problem is to choose the level of care that minimizes his total expected
loss L = c(y,n)+λ(y)l.23 In order to guarantee the existence of an interior solution to the
defendant’s optimization problem, we assume that λ (y) < 0 (the probability of accident is a
decreasing function of the level of care); λ  (y) > 0 (expenditures on accident prevention exhibit
23The values of l for the negligent and careful defendant are equal to -VDN and -VDC respectively.
7diminishing marginal returns); limy→+∞ λ(y) = 0 (inﬁnitely high level of care makes the probability
of accident inﬁnitely small) and λ(0) = 1. In addition, we assume that cn(y,n) < 0( ﬁ r m sw i t h
higher n are more eﬃcient and need to spend less to achieve a given level of care) and that cy(y,n) >
0 (higher levels of care require larger expenditures on safety). We also assume that cyy(y,n) > 0
(the marginal cost of care increases with the degree of care, i.e., cy(y,n)i si n c r e a s i n gi ny)a n dt h a t
cny(y,n) < 0 (the marginal cost of care is greater for injurers of lower skill, i.e., cy(y,n) is decreasing
in n). For both functions c(.)a n dλ(.), we assume that their ﬁrst and second partial derivatives are
continuous functions. The ﬁnal technical assumption is that limy→+0 λ (y)
(fA−KP)KD
A+KD +cy(y,n) < 0.
It is easy to show that under these assumptions the function L = c(y,n)+λ(y)l is convex and U-
shaped for any positive n and any l ≥
(fA−KP)KD
A+KD . Therefore, it has a single interior minimum.24




c(y,n)+λ(y)(fA− KP)i fy<¯ y
c(y,n)+λ(y)
fA−KP
A+KD KD if y ≥ ¯ y.
(4)
The total expected loss L (for a given n) is then a discontinuous function of y, with discontinuity
at the point y =¯ y. L follows the function c(y,n)+λ(y)(fA−KP) until the point of discontinuity;
after this point, L follows the function c(y,n)+λ(y)
fA−KP
A+KD KD.G i v e nt h a tfA−KP >
(fA−KP)KD
A+KD ,
the function L shifts down discontinuously at the point y =¯ y. Lemmas 1 and 2 (in Appendix A)
show that the value of y that minimizes the total expected loss function for a negligent defendant
of a given type is higher than the value of y that minimizes the total expected loss function for a
careful defendant of the same type. Therefore the combined loss function can have at most one
interior local minimum.25 Figure 2 illustrates the function L.
24Assumptions λ




A+KD +cy(y,n) < 0, then limy→+0 L
  < 0f o rb o t hl =
(fA−KP )KD
A+KD and l = fA−KP. Therefore
the function L is decreasing for suﬃciently small values of y. On the other hand, given that limy→+∞ λ(y)=0 ,t h e
term λ(y)l vanishes in the limit, and for suﬃciently large values of y, the function L is increasing in y just because
c(y,n)is increasing in y.
25If the value of y that minimizes the total expected loss for the careful defendant were larger than the value of
y that minimizes the expected loss for the negligent defendant, it would be possible that the combined loss function
had two interior minima, one greater than ¯ y (in the careful range)and one smaller than ¯ y (in the negligent range).
8[INSERT FIGURE 2]
Note that the total expected loss function is diﬀerent for each type n. Proposition 2 summarizes
the relationship between the defendant’s type and the optimal level of care.
Proposition 2: Given f,¯ y, A, KP, KD, potential defendants pertain to one of the following interval
types: a low-type interval, n<n , whose members choose y =a r gm i n {c(y,n)+λ(y)[fA−KP]} < ¯ y;
an intermediate-type interval, n ≤ n ≤ ¯ n, whose members choose ¯ y; and, a high-type interval,
n>¯ n, whose members choose y =a r gm i n {c(y,n)+λ(y)
fA−KP
A+KD KD} > ¯ y.
For a low-type defendant, the optimal level of care is an interior minimum of {c(y,n)+λ(y)(fA−
KP)} and is lower than the negligence standard. That is, y =a r gm i n {c(y,n)+λ(y)[fA−KP]} < ¯ y.
The optimal level of care is increasing in n until the point where the defendant of that type interval
is indiﬀerent between being negligent and just meeting the standard. This critical level of skill is
denoted by n and separates the low interval and the intermediate-type interval.
The critical skill n is implicitly deﬁned by the following two conditions







(y)[fA− KP]=0 . (6)
Equation (5) states that the defendant of type n is indiﬀerent between being negligent and exactly
meeting the standard. Equation (6) uses the fact that n is an interior minimum of the loss function
{c(y,n)+λ(y)(fA− KP)}, and therefore its derivative with respect to y should be equal to zero.
Figure 3 shows the total expected loss function for an n-type defendant.
[INSERT FIGURE 3]
The other critical level of skill is ¯ n. It separates the intermediate interval and the high-type inter-
val. Intermediate-type defendants with n such that n ≤ n<¯ n just meet the standard (y =¯ y), while
9the intermediate-type defendants of type ¯ n have the interior minimum of c(y,n)+λ(y)
fA−KP
A+KD KD
just at ¯ y.
The critical skill ¯ n is implicitly deﬁned by the condition stated in equation (7). This condition
uses the fact that ¯ n is an interior minimum of the loss function {c(y,n)+λ(y)
fA−KP
A+KD KD},a n d
hence its derivative is equal to zero. It also takes into account the fact that the injurer of the type






KD =0 . (7)
Figure 4 shows the total expected loss function for an ¯ n-type defendant.
[INSERT FIGURE 4]
The defendants pertaining to the high-type interval (n>¯ n) choose a higher level of care
(greater than the negligence standard), which is the interior minimum of the function {c(y,n)+
λ(y)
fA−KP




The relationship between the defendant’s type and the optimal level of care is illustrated by the
solid line in Figure 5.
[INSERT FIGURE 5]
For the low-type interval, the optimal level of care is increasing in n until the critical level of
skill n. From Figure 3, it is clear why the optimal care schedule is discontinuous at n.T h el e v e lo f
care that makes the negligent defendant indiﬀerent between remaining negligent and just meeting
the standard, y(n), is smaller than ¯ y. Hence defendants with lower skill level (n<n ) will choose
the care level y(n) <y (n) < ¯ y. But defendants with slightly higher skill level (n>n ) will choose
just to meet the care standard, y(n)=¯ y. For high values of n (after the point n =¯ n), the optimal
level of care is also increasing in n.
10Lemmas 3–6 (in Appendix A) verify formally that the value of y that minimizes loss functions
is increasing in n;¯ n>n ; defendants with n<nﬁnd it optimal to be negligent and defendants
with n ≥ n ﬁnd it optimal to be careful; and, defendants with n ≤ ¯ n do not exceed the standard
and defendants with n>¯ n exceed the standard.
Using the previous results, we can now derive the unconditional probabilities of trial, out-of-
court settlement and dropping the case. Start with the analysis of the probability of an accident
involving a careful defendant. Let φ(n) be the probability density function of the distribution of
potential injurers by type. Then, the probability of an accident is µ(0) =
 
n≥0 λ(y(n))φ(n)dn,a n d
the probability of an accident involving a careful defendant is given by µ(n)=
 
n≥n λ(y(n))φ(n)dn.
Given that the probability of trial conditional on occurrence of the accident is
fA(1−q)
A+KD and (1−q)
is the probability that a defendant has been careful conditional on the occurrence of an accident,
the unconditional probability of trial is given by
fA(1−q)
A+KD µ(0). Given that the probability of an
accident involving a careful defendant is given by µ(n), then by Bayes’ rule, (1 − q)=µ(n)/µ(0).
Hence, the unconditional probability of trial is equal to
fA
A+KDµ(n). Similarly, given that the
probability of out-of-court settlement conditional on occurrence of the accident is equal to
qfA−KP
fA−KP ,
then the unconditional probability of out-of-court settlement is equal to µ(0) − (
fA
fA−KP )µ(n).




















This section evaluates the eﬀects of a change in f (plaintiﬀ’s share of the punitive award) on the
level of care, probabilities of an accident and trial, and social costs of accidents. We assume that
a change in f is small enough to preserve the conditions qfA− KP > 0a n dfA− KP >K D
Proposition 3. A decrease in f decreases the level of care (if the optimal level of care diﬀers from
t h ec a r es t a n d a r d¯ y) and increases both n and ¯ n.
11Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 3 shows that for low-type and the high-type defendants (for those with n<nand
n>¯ n), a reduction in f reduces their level of care. In addition, a reduction in f increases both
n and ¯ n: some ﬁrms which just met the standard for a higher f become negligent for a lower f
(move from the intermediate-type interval to the low-type interval), and some careful ﬁrms which
exceeded the standard for a higher f reduce their level of care to the standard for a lower f (move
from the high-type interval to the intermediate-type interval). The intuition behind these results
is as follows. A reduction in f decreases the expected loss from litigation for negligent and careful
defendants. This will induce a general downward shift in the optimal schedule of care (except for
the middle values of n). In particular, one consequence will be that fewer ﬁrms meet the standard.
This eﬀect is shown in Figure 5 (presented in the previous section), where the solid curve denotes
the optimal schedule of care under a higher value of f and the dotted curve shows the optimal
schedule of care when f is decreased.
The eﬀects of a change in f on the probability of an accident and unconditional and conditional
probabilities of trial are summarized in Propositions 4 and 5.
Proposition 4: A decrease in f increases the probability of an accident.
Proof. See Appendix A.
By assumption, the probability of an accident is negatively related to the level of care, for any
n. We also know that if f decreases, some ﬁrms diminish their level of care and become negligent
(move to the low-type interval) and some ﬁrms remain careful but reduce their level of care (move
to the intermediate-type interval). Then, the probability of an accident for those ﬁrms increases.
In addition, a lower f will generate lower levels of care for the low and high type interval ﬁrms
and therefore, increase the probability of an accident for those ﬁrms. We can then conclude that a
decrease in f will increase the probability of an accident.
Deﬁne nm as the maximum possible value of n.




Proof. See Appendix A.
The unconditional probability of trial
fA
(A+KD)µ(n) is positively related to the probability of an
accident involving a careful defendant µ(n). A decrease in f will lead some potential injurers to
decrease their level of care and not to meet the standard (move from the intermediate-type interval
to the low-type interval). This decrease in the number of careful defendants reduces the probability
that a careful defendant will be involved in an accident. On the other hand, the decrease in f will
lead potential injurers who previously met the standard at levels of care greater than ¯ y to take
less care and just meet the standard (move from the high-type interval to the intermediate-type
interval), which increases the probability that a careful injurer will be involved in an accident.
Then, the net eﬀect may be to decrease or increase the unconditional probability of trial. However,
under the condition stated in Proposition 5, which implies that no ﬁrm belongs to the high-type
(i.e., the most eﬃcient ﬁrms choose to just meet the care standard and not to exceed it), the
unconditional probability of trial depends positively on f.
The eﬀect of f on the conditional probability of trial
fA
A+KDµ(n) 1
µ(0) can be explained by the
positive relationship between f and the unconditional probability of trial
fA
(A+KD)µ(n), and the
negative relationship between f and the probability of an accident µ(0).
The eﬀects of f on the social costs of accidents are described next. Deﬁne the social cost of













where c(y,n) represents the expenditures on accident prevention; λ(y(n)) is the probability of
an accident; H represents the harm (damage) an accident causes to society, conditional on the
13occurrence of an accident;26 fA(1−q)
A+KD is the conditional probability of trial; and (KD + KP)a r et h e
resources spent on litigation when a trial occurs (litigation costs).
Given that µ(0) =
 
n≥0 λ(y(n))φ(n)dn and µ(n)=( 1− q)µ(0), the social welfare loss function

















c(y,n)φ(n)dn + Hµ(0) +
fA
A + KD
µ(n)(KP + KD). (9)
The ﬁrst term of this expression
 
n≥0 c(y,n)φ(n)dn represents the aggregate expenditures on ac-
cident prevention. A decrease in f reduces the level of care of ﬁrms of the low-type and high-
type intervals and does not aﬀect the level of care of ﬁrms of the intermediate-type interval.
Therefore the aggregate expenditures on accident prevention must decrease.27 The third term
fA
A+KDµ(n)(KP +KD) denotes the unconditional expected litigation costs, where
fA
A+KDµ(n)i st h e
unconditional probability of trial. By Proposition 3, if no defendant belongs to the high-type in-
terval, the unconditional probability of trial positively depends on f. Therefore, a decrease in f
will reduce the unconditional expected litigation cost. The second term Hµ(0) is the unconditional
expected damage that accidents cause to society. We know that a decrease in f lowers the level
of care and therefore, increases the probability of an accident µ(0). So, we can conclude that a
decrease in f increases the unconditional expected damage that accidents cause to society.
Thus, the eﬀect of a decrease in f on the social costs of accidents is, in general, ambiguous
because a reduction in f decreases the aggregate expenditures on accident prevention, decreases
the unconditional expected litigation costs (by reducing the unconditional probability of trial) but
increases the unconditional expected damage that accidents cause to society (by increasing the
26We characterize the total damage that accidents cause to society as follows: 1)direct monetary damage to the
plaintiﬀ, that we assume is fully compensated with the compensatory award; 2)damage to society (including the
plaintiﬀ)in the form of reckless behavior from the injurer that can be followed by others, for which the defendant is
punished with the punitive award. Given that we abstract from the compensatory award in the litigation analysis,
we also abstract here from the direct monetary damage to the plaintiﬀ.
27By assumption, cy(y,n) > 0.
14frequency of accidents due to a reduction in the level of care). However, under the condition stated
in Proposition 6, a decrease in f unambiguously decreases the social cost of accidents and therefore,
increases the social welfare.
















Proposition 6: Assume that arg min{c(y,nm)+λ(y)
fA−KP
A+KD KD}≤¯ y. A decrease in f decreases
the social costs of accidents if and only if the social harm H is lower than the threshold T(f)f o ra
given f.
Proof. See Appendix A.
This condition can be interpreted as follows. If the eﬃciency of all potential injurers in achieving
certain level of care is below the threshold ¯ n (if there are no high-type ﬁrms) and the harm an
accident causes to society is suﬃciently low for a particular value of f,28 the split-award statute
unambiguously reduces the social cost of accidents. This is because the negative welfare eﬀect of
this reform (the increase in the unconditional expected damage that accidents cause to society)
is oﬀset by the positive welfare eﬀect of the statute (the reduction in the unconditional expected
litigation costs and the reduction in the aggregate expenditures on care).
4 Conclusions
This research contributes to the economic analysis of tort reforms by constructing a model that
incorporates the eﬀect of the split-award statute on liability and litigation. This framework allows
for heterogeneity in ﬁrms’ costs of preventing accidents and generates an equilibrium in which the
more eﬃcient ﬁrms choose to be careful and the less eﬃcient ones choose to be negligent, and some
lawsuits are dropped, some are resolved out-of-court and some go to trial. Our analysis highlights
28Notice that when H is equal to the threshold T(f), CS is unaﬀected by a marginal change in f (i.e.,
∂CS
∂f =0 ).
15the eﬀect of the split-award statute on the potential injurer’s level of care. In particular, it shows
that the split-award statute may reduce the social cost of accidents if the eﬃciency of potential
injurers in achieving certain level of care is below some threshold and the social harm from an
accident is suﬃciently low.
Avenues for further research may involve the incorporation of frivolous lawsuits into the model.
If the defendant cannot distinguish between truly injured and uninjured plaintiﬀs (frivolous cases)
before the trial, an opportunistic person has an incentive to ﬁle a frivolous suit in order to extract
a positive settlement oﬀer. Following Katz (1990) and Miceli (1994), it is possible to introduce a
ﬁling cost into the model, so that in equilibrium, prospective uninjured plaintiﬀs randomize between
ﬁling and not ﬁling a lawsuit. It will be interesting to investigate how this setup change aﬀects
the equilibrium of the litigation game, the level of care that the prospective defendant chooses,
and the impact of the split-award statute. Another potential extension would be to assume that
the plaintiﬀ hires a lawyer to ﬁle the lawsuit, and that this lawyer works on a contingency basis.29
Miceli (1994) shows that, under certain conditions (i.e., a high threat of frivolous litigation), the
contingency fee results in fewer frivolous suits and lower total litigation costs. Given the results of
our model, we would expect that the lower litigation costs reduce the level of care of the defendant
and increase the likelihood of an accident. Hence it would be important to analyze whether the
overall welfare eﬀect is positive or negative.
29Under a contingent-fee compensation, the attorney receives a percentage of the plaintiﬀ’s out-of-court settlements
or trial award as a compensation for her services.
16Appendix A. Proofs
Proofs of Proposition 1, Lemmas 1–6 and Propositions 3–6 follow.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof has three parts: in the ﬁrst part, we show that the equilibrium
proposed in Proposition 1 is a PBE (proof of existence); in the second part, we describe the other
partially separating equilibria under the conditions qfA − KP > 0a n dfA− KP >K D; and,
in the third part, we show that the equilibrium proposed in Proposition 1 is the only separating
equilibrium that survives the universal divinity reﬁnement and therefore, is the unique PBE of the
litigation stage (proof of uniqueness).30
First, we prove that the strategy proﬁle, together with the players’ beliefs, stated in Proposition
1 is a PBE of the litigation stage.
Consider the expected payoﬀs for the plaintiﬀ, careful and negligent defendants, in terms of α
and β. The expected payoﬀ for the plaintiﬀ VP is
VP =( 1− q)[α(−KP)+( 1− α)(0)] + qβ[α(fA− KP)+( 1− α)(0)] + (1 − β)(fA− KP). (A1)
The expected payoﬀ for the careful defendant VDC is
VDC = α(−KD)+( 1− α)(0). (A2)
And, the expected payoﬀ for the negligent defendant, VDN is
VDN = β[α(−(A + KD)) + (1 − α)(0)] + (1 − β)[−(fA− KP)]. (A3)
The values of α and β are calculated from the condition that both parties (the plaintiﬀ and the
negligent defendant) have to be indiﬀerent between their strategies to mix them. So,
fA− KP = α(A + KD)( A4)
30See Reinganum and Wilde (1986)and Schweizer (1989)for previous applications of the universal divinity reﬁne-




qβ +( 1− q)
(fA− KP)+
1 − q
qβ +( 1− q)
(−KP). (A5)
Equation (A4) says that a negligent defendant is indiﬀerent between admitting his negligence
(i.e., oﬀering S2 = fA− KP) and stating that he is careful (i.e., oﬀering S1 =0 )w i t ht h er i s kt o
lose A + KD if the case goes to court. Equation (A5) says that a plaintiﬀ is indiﬀerent between
dropping the case and getting a payoﬀ of 0 and going to court. Solving (4) for α and (5) for β we
get α =
fA−KP
A+KD and β =
KP(1−q)
q(fA−KP).
Then, the expected payoﬀs for the plaintiﬀ and careful and negligent defendant are VP =






and VDN = −(fA− KP), respectively.
The oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs that support the PBE are as follows. When the plaintiﬀ receives an
oﬀer S
 
such that 0 <S
 
<fA− KP, the plaintiﬀ believes that this oﬀer was made by a negligent
defendant. Then, the plaintiﬀ rejects the oﬀer with certainty because she will obtain a higher payoﬀ
(fA− KP) if she brings the negligent defendant to trial. Given that S
 
is rejected with certainty,
the careful defendant will not make the oﬀer S
 
because he will receive a higher payoﬀ by oﬀering
S1 = 0, which is accepted with positive probability in the proposed equilibrium. Given that the
plaintiﬀ will reject the oﬀer S
 
with certainty, the negligent defendant will not make an oﬀer S
 
because he will receive a higher payoﬀ by oﬀering S2 = fA− KP with probability (1 − β)a n d
S1 = 0 with probability β (as stated in the proposed equilibrium).
Note also that VP = qfA− KP > 0. Therefore, plaintiﬀs ﬁle a suit with probability one.
Second, we demonstrate that under the conditions qfA− KP > 0a n dfA− KP >K D,t h e r e
are other partially separating equilibria of the litigation stage, that are not empirically relevant
(i.e., they do not allow for lawsuits to be dropped).
The description of these other partially separating equilibria is as follows. If qfA−KP > 0a n d
fA− KP >K D: 1) careful defendants oﬀer S1 such that 0 <S 1 ≤ KD, and negligent defendants
mix the two strategies, oﬀer S1 such that 0 <S 1 ≤ KD with probability ˜ β and oﬀer S2 = fA−KP
18with probability (1 − ˜ β); 2) plaintiﬀs always ﬁle a lawsuit; plaintiﬀs always accept S2
31 and mix
between rejection (with probability ˜ α) and acceptance (with probability (1 − ˜ α) when the oﬀer is
S1 such that 0 <S 1 ≤ KD.32
To mix the two strategies, S1 and S2, the negligent defendant has to be indiﬀerent between
them. Also, to mix acceptance and rejection of S1, the plaintiﬀ has to be indiﬀerent between them.
Speciﬁcally, plaintiﬀs reject S1 with probability ˜ α =
fA−KP−S1
A+KD−S1 and accept it with the comple-
mentary probability (1 − ˜ α). In equilibrium, the negligent defendant oﬀers S1 with probability
˜ β =
(S1+KP)(1−q)
q(fA−S1−KP) and S2 with the complementary probability (1 − ˜ β).33
The equilibrium beliefs are as follows. If an accident occurs, the plaintiﬀ believes with probabil-
ity (1−q) that she is confronting a careful defendant, and with probability q that she is confronting
a negligent defendant. When the plaintiﬀ receives an oﬀer, she updates her beliefs using Bayes’
rule: when she receives an oﬀer S1, she believes with probability
(1−q)
q˜ β+(1−q) that she is confronting
a careful defendant and with probability
q˜ β
q˜ β+(1−q) that she is confronting a negligent defendant;
when the plaintiﬀ receives an oﬀer S2, she believes with certainty that she is confronting a negligent
defendant. The oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs are as follows. When the plaintiﬀ observes an oﬀer S
 
<S 1
or an oﬀer S1 <S
 
<f A− KP, she believes that she faces a negligent defendant and rejects the
oﬀer with certainty.
Note also that VP = qfA− KP > 0. Therefore, plaintiﬀs ﬁle a suit with probability one.
Third, we will prove that the PBE stated in Proposition 1 is the only partially separating PBE
that survives the universal divinity reﬁnement, and therefore, it is the unique equilibrium of the
litigation stage.
The implementation of the universal divinity reﬁnement proceeds as follows. First, ﬁnd (for
careful and negligent defendants) the minimum probability of acceptance (by the plaintiﬀ) of an
oﬀer that diﬀers from the equilibrium oﬀers (deviation oﬀer), such that the defendant is willing to
31A defendant oﬀering S2 reveals his type, and hence S2 should be equal to fA− KP to be always accepted.
32As the plaintiﬀ accepts some of the oﬀers of S1, a negligent defendant has an incentive to mimic the behavior of
the careful defendant and oﬀer S1 as well.
33Note that ˜ α(S1 =0 )=α and ˜ β(S1 =0 )=β.
19deviate. Second, compare these minimum probabilities. The defendant with the lower minimum
probability will be the one the plaintiﬀ should expect (with probability one) to deviate.
Consider the deviation S
 
from an equilibrium oﬀer S1 or S2. We will cover the analysis of three




= KD and KD <S
 
<fA− KP.
Case I: 0 ≤ S
 
<K D
For mathematical convenience, deﬁne S
 
= S1 −  .I f <0, then the deviation oﬀer S
 
>S 1;
and, if  >0, then the deviation oﬀer S
 
<S 1.
Proceed ﬁrst to analyze the case of the negligent defendant. The negligent defendant will be
willing to deviate if
pN(S1 −  )+( 1− pN)(A + KD) ≤ (fA− KP), (A6)
where the left-hand side of the inequality represents the expected loss for the negligent defendant
from deviating and the right-hand side represents his expected loss in equilibrium.34 Solving for
pN we get
pN ≥
(1 − f)A + KP + KD
A + KD − S1 +  
. (A7)
Then, the minimum probability of acceptance of the deviation oﬀer made by the negligent defendant
is
pN =
(1 − f)A + KP + KD
A + KD − S1 +  
. (A8)
Now ﬁnd the minimum probability of acceptance of the deviation by the plaintiﬀ, such that the
careful defendant is still willing to propose it.
pC(S1 −  )+( 1− pC)KD ≤
 
S1(1 −
fA− KP − S1
A + KD − S1
)+KD
fA− KP − S1
A + KD − S1
 
, (A9)
34Note that in every partially separating PBE of the litigation game (under the conditions qfA − KP > 0a n d
fA− KP >K D)the expected payoﬀ for the negligent defendant is fA− KP.
20where the left-hand side of the inequality represents the expected loss for the careful defendant
from deviating and the right-hand side represents his expected loss in equilibrium.35 Solving for
pC we get
pC ≥
[(1 − f)A + KD + KP](KD − S1)
(A + KD − S1)(KD − S1 +  )
. (A10)
Then, the minimum probability of acceptance of the deviation oﬀer made by the careful defendant
is
pC =
(1 − f)A + KD + K − P(KD − S1)
(A + KD − S1)(KD − S1 +  )
. (A11)
Compare the threshold probabilities for the negligent and careful defendant.
pC−pN =[ ( 1 −f)A+KD+KP]
 
(KD − S1)(A + KD − S1 +  ) − (A + KD − S1)(KD − S1 +  )




−A [(1 − f)A + KD + KP]
(A + KD − S1)(KD − S1 +  )(A + KD − S1 +  )
, (A12)
where the expressions in bracket and parentheses are positive. Then, if  <0, pN <p C; and, if
 >0, pN >p C
Following the universally divinity reﬁnement, if 0 ≤ S
 
<K D and  <0( S
 
>S 1), the plaintiﬀ
should believe that the deviation S
 
comes from a negligent defendant with probability one. On the
other hand, if  >0( S
 
<S 1), the plaintiﬀ should believe with probability one that the deviation
S
 
comes from a careful defendant.
Apply the universal divinity reﬁnement to the other partially separating equilibria (where 0 <
S1 ≤ KD). The oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs imply that the plaintiﬀ should infer that any deviation S
 
comes from a negligent defendant. In case of  >0( S
 
<S 1), these oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs do
not survive the reﬁnement. The plaintiﬀ should believe that the deviation comes from a careful
35Remember that ˜ α(S1 =0 )=α. Given that we need to apply the results of this proof to check all partially
separating PBE of the litigation game, we will use ˜ α in the computation of the expected payoﬀ for the careful
defendant. Note that in every partially separating PBE of the litigation game (under the conditions qfA − KP > 0
and fA− KP >K D)the expected payoﬀ for the careful defendant does depend on S1.
21defendant and accept the oﬀer. This response from the plaintiﬀ will generate an incentive for the
negligent defendant to deviate and oﬀer S1 −  . Hence, the other partially separating equilibria
(where 0 <S 1 ≤ KD) do not pass the test of universal divinity for 0 ≤ S
 
<K D.
We will apply now the universal divinity reﬁnement to the empirically relevant equilibrium
(where S1 = 0). The oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs imply that the plaintiﬀ should infer that any deviation
comes from a negligent defendant. Note also that given that S1 = 0 is the lowest possible oﬀer,
only deviations above S1 (i.e., S
 
>S 1) are possible. Therefore, the oﬀ-equilibrium beliefs survive
the universal divinity reﬁnement. Hence, the empirically relevant equilibrium passes the test of






The minimum probability of acceptance of a deviation oﬀer made by the negligent defendant is
still given by equation (A8).
For the case of the careful defendant, note that his expected deviation loss is KD and his
expected equilibrium loss is in the interval (
fA−KP
A+KD ,K D)( f o r0<S 1 <K D) and is equal to
fA−KP
A+KD <K D (for S1 = 0). Then, for any probability of acceptance, the careful defendant will not
be willing to deviate when S
 
= KD.
By universal divinity, the plaintiﬀ should expect that any deviation oﬀer S
 
= KD comes from




Case III: KD <S
 
<fA− KP
The minimum probability of acceptance of a deviation oﬀer made by the negligent defendant is
still given by equation (A8).
For the case of the careful defendant, note that his expected deviation loss is greater than KD
and his expected equilibrium loss is in the interval (
fA−KP
A+KD ,K D]( f o r0<S 1 ≤ KD) and is equal
to
fA−KP
A+KD <K D (for S1 = 0). Then, for any probability of acceptance, the careful defendant will
not be willing to deviate when KD <S
 
<fA− KP.





22fA− KP) comes from a negligent defendant. Thus, all partially separating PBE pass the test of
universal divinity for KD <S
 
<fA− KP.
Given that the empirically relevant PBE is the only partially separating equilibrium that sur-
vives the universal divinity reﬁnement in all three cases, we conclude that this is the unique uni-
versally divine PBE of the litigation stage. Q.E.D.
Lemma 1. For any positive value of l,t h ev a l u eo fy that minimizes the function c(y,n)+λ(y)l is
increasing in l.
Proof. Given the assumptions about the functions c(n,y)a n dλ(y), the function c(y,n)+λ(y)l is
convex, and it has a single minimum point which is characterized by the ﬁrst-order condition,
cy(y,n)+λ (y)l =0 . (A13)
Totally diﬀerentiating this ﬁrst-order condition yields
[cyy(y,n)+λ  (y)l]dy = −λ (y)dl. (A14)







This inequality holds because both second derivatives, cyy(y,n)a n dλ  (y), are positive, λ (y) <
0, and l ≥
(fA−KP)KD
A+KD > 0 by assumption. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2. For all n,t h ev a l u eo fy that minimizes the function c(y,n)+λ(y)(fA− KP) is larger





A+KD <fA− KP. Hence the lemma is a direct application of Lemma 1. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3. The value of y that minimizes the function c(y,n)+λ(y)l is increasing in n.
Proof. Totally diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order condition (A13) yields
cyy(y,n)dy + cyn(y,n)dn + λ  (y)ldy =0 . (A16)







The last inequality follows from the assumption cyn(y,n) > 0. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4. For any ¯ y, n < ¯ n.






is increasing in y at ¯ y. Hence




















By Lemma 3, it follows that n < ¯ n. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5.F o rﬁ r m sw i t hn<nthe optimal level of care y<¯ y.F o rﬁ r m sw i t hn ≥ n,t h eo p t i m a l
level of care y ≥ ¯ y.




Consider the following auxiliary function
Φ(n)={LN(n, ¯ y) − min{LN(n,y)}} − [LN(n, ¯ y) − LC(n, ¯ y)]. (A19)
It is more costly for the ﬁrm to satisfy the negligence standard than to be negligent at the minimum
point y∗ of the function LN(n,y) if and only if the function Φ(n) attains a positive value. Notice
that the second part of the function Φ,











24is independent of n. The ﬁrst part,
{LN(n, ¯ y) − min{LN(n,y)}} = LN(n, ¯ y) − LN(n,y∗(n)) (A21)
depends negatively on n, because the diﬀerence between y∗ and ¯ y shrinks as n rises (see Lemma
3), and the function LN(n,y) is ﬂatter for larger values of n. The last claim follows from the
assumption cny < 0.
By deﬁnition of n, the ﬁrm of the type n is indiﬀerent between just meeting the standard and
being negligent at y∗. Therefore, the point n is the root of the function Φ(n). Hence for n<n ,
Φ(n) > 0, and the ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to be negligent. For n ≥ n,Φ ( n) ≤ 0, and the ﬁrms ﬁnd it
optimal to be careful. Q.E.D.
Lemma 6.F o rﬁ r m sw i t hn ≤ ¯ n the optimal level of care y ≤ ¯ y.F o rﬁ r m sw i t hn>¯ n,t h eo p t i m a l
level of care y>¯ y.
Proof. Deﬁne LN and LC as follows: LN = c(y,n)+λ(y)(fA − KP)a n dLC = c(y,n)+
λ(y)
fA−KP
A+KD KD. The proof follows from the deﬁnition of ¯ n.¯ y is the interior minimum of the
function LC(¯ n,y). By Lemma 3, for n>¯ n, the function LC(n,y) attains its minimum to the right
of ¯ y, i.e., y∗ > ¯ y. Hence, this interior minimum is the optimal level of care for the ﬁrm of that type
(LC(n,y) <L N(n,y) for any y, and hence it cannot be optimal for the ﬁrm to be negligent). On
the other hand, for n<¯ n, the function LC(n,y) attains its minimum to the left of ¯ y. LC(n,y)i s
an increasing function of y for y ≥ ¯ y and n ≤ ¯ n. Hence the ﬁrms of these types will at most just
meet the negligence standard. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. We will prove ﬁrst the claim that a decrease in f decreases the level of care,
if the optimal level of care diﬀers from the care standard ¯ y.
Consider the case when the ﬁrm is negligent. Evaluating (A13) at l = fA− KP and totally
diﬀerentiating it yields






cyy(y,n)+λ  (y)[fA− KP]
> 0. (A23)
The case when the ﬁrm is careful can be proven in exactly the same way.
Next we show that the plaintiﬀ’s share of the punitive award f and n are negatively related.
Let y be the optimal level of care that the ﬁrm with n = n chooses if it prefers to be negligent
(the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between choosing y and ¯ y). Consider the following equations
cy(y,n)+λ (y)[Af − KP]=0 ( A24)
and




which implicitly deﬁne n and y. Totally diﬀerentiating equation (A25), one gets




By equation (A24), the ﬁrst and the last terms of the left-hand side of equation (A26) add up
to zero. Hence,
 




Adf =( cn(¯ y,n) − cn(y,n))dn = cny(˜ y,n)(¯ y − y)dn. (A27)
The last transformation is a straightforward application of the mean-value theorem, and ˜ y
is a point of the interval (y, ¯ y). (λ(y) − λ(¯ y) KD
KD+A)A is positive, because the function λ(y)i s
monotonically decreasing in y and KD
A+KD < 1. cny(˜ y,n)(¯ y − y) is negative, because cny < 0b y
assumption, and y < ¯ y. Therefore
∂n
∂f < 0.
Second, we will prove the claim that the plaintiﬀ’s share of the punitive award f and ¯ n are
negatively related.








=0 ,w eo b t a i n
cyn(¯ y,¯ n)d¯ n + λ (¯ y)
AKD
A + KD








because cyn < 0, and λ (¯ y) < 0. Q.E.D.












φ(n)dn < 0( A30)
because
∂y(n)
∂f ≥ 0 for any n and λ [y(n)] < 0 for any n. Q.E.D.









λ(y(n))φ(n)dn = λ(¯ y)
  nm
n
φ(n)dn = λ(¯ y)(1 − Φ(n)), (A31)





∂f < 0. Hence a decrease in f decreases µ(n).






i.e., the unconditional probability of trial divided by the probability of an accident. A reduction
in f decreases the unconditional probability of trial and increases the probability of accident µ(0).
Q.E.D.

























∂f < 0a n d
∂µ(n)
∂f > 0. ∂CS
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SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN THE GAME
Nature decides D’s type n
D chooses level of care y
Accident does
not occur Game ends
Accident occurs
D damages P
P ﬁles a lawsuit
D makes an oﬀer S P accepts Game ends
P rejects KP, KD
Trial
No award




Note: D = defendant, P = plaintiﬀ, KD = defendant’s litigation costs, KP = plaintiﬀ’s
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